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In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action, and the 
DREAM Act 
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia* 
I. Introduction 
This essay responds to Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care 
Clause by Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo.1  Delahunty and Yoo make 
four main arguments: 1) the President has a constitutional duty to execute the 
laws faithfully and has breached this duty by exercising deferred action for 
people who qualify under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) program;2 2) presidential “prerogative” is limited to actions that are 
related to national security in times of a war or related crisis and not to 
domestic immigration policy;3 3) the Administration’s implementation of 
DACA cannot be justified by any of the various “defenses” or exceptions 
that allow a President to “breach” his duty to execute the laws faithfully;4 and 
4) Congress, not the Administration, has the power to regulate domestic 
immigration law.5 
 
* Clinical Professor of Law and Director, Center for Immigrants’ Rights, Pennsylvania State 
University, Dickinson School of Law.  I send a big thank you to David A. Martin, Michael Olivas, 
and Margaret Stock for their comments.  I also appreciate the research assistance from Stephen 
Coccorese.  I am grateful to Dean Phil McConnaughay for his support of my scholarship and also to 
Hemal, Devyani, and Neelesh for their boundless love. 
1. Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEXAS L. 
REV. 781 (2013). 
2. Id. at 784–785. 
3. Id. at 812. 
4. Id. at 835. 
5. Id. at 837. 
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Though I credit Delahunty and Yoo for considering the relationship 
between the DACA program and the President’s duties under the Take Care 
clause, they miss the mark in at least three ways: 1) contrary to ignoring 
immigration enforcement, the Obama Administration has executed the 
immigration laws faithfully and forcefully;6 2) far from being a new policy 
that undercuts statutory law, prosecutorial discretion actions like DACA have 
been pursued by other presidents and part of the immigration system for at 
least thirty-five years;7 and 3) despite the unsurprising fact that some people 
who could qualify for the congressionally created DREAM Act possess the 
kinds of equities that make them attractive for a prosecutorial discretion 
program like DACA, it is simply inaccurate to equate the limbo status 
offered with a grant under DACA to the secure status that attaches to those 
eligible under the congressional solution known as the DREAM Act.  This 
essay examines these three points in greater detail below.8 
 
6. See ICE Total Removals, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/ero-removals.pdf. 
7. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 246–52 (2010); see also Letter from a Group of Law Professors to 
President Obama (May 28, 2012), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/executive 
authorityfordreamrelief28may2012withsignatures.pdf. 
8. Beyond the scope of this essay but of note is the striking position taken by Yoo during his 
tenure as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General during the George W. Bush Administration.  
Specifically, Yoo wrote a series of memoranda in support of the President’s unfettered 
“Commander-in-Chief” authority during times of war.  One of these policies, infamously known as 
the “torture memo,” argued in eighty-one detailed pages the President’s authority to seize, detain, 
and interrogate enemy combatants.  See, e.g., Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant 
Att’y Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., on Military Interrogation of 
Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States (March 14, 2003), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc-interrogation.pdf; Elise Foley, John Yoo, ‘Torture Memo’ 
Author, Says Obama Violated Constitution With Deferred Action Policy, THE HUFFINGTON POST 
(Oct. 15, 2012, 5:43 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/15/john-yoo-obama-deffered-
action_n_1966955.html.  The torture memo was criticized by select members of Congress and by 
the Department of Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S 
MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF 
“ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (July 29, 2009), available 
at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf.  In response to the gap 
between Yoo’s position in favor of presidential powers in the context of “torture” with the 
President’s authority to implement the DACA program, Yoo responded, 
There is a world of difference between putting aside laws that interfere with an 
executive response to an attack on the country, as in Sept. 11, 2001, and ignoring laws 
to appeal to a constituency vital to re-election . . . . The former recognizes the 
president’s primary duty to protect the national security.  The latter, unfortunately, 
represents a twisting of the Constitution’s fabric for partisan ends. 
Foley, supra.  I do not agree with Yoo’s rationale.  First, national security is itself a basis for 
prosecutorial discretion programs like DACA (e.g., a person who poses a national security risk is 
ineligible for DACA).  Second, far from serving as a partisan tool for reelection, prosecutorial 
discretion programs like DACA reflect a reasonable administrative tool aimed at managing 
priorities and protecting those with compelling equities. 




Before addressing Delahunty and Yoo’s article, a brief description of 
the immigration structure and powers is necessary.  The primary statute for 
immigration is called the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  The INA 
was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1952 and has been amended many times 
since.9  The cabinet level Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was 
created in the aftermath of September 11, 2011, and, as a practical matter, 
absorbed many of the immigration functions once handled by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).10  The main operating units 
for immigration within DHS are Customs and Border Protection (CBP),11  
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),12 and United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).13  Another notable federal 
agency is the Department of Justice (DOJ), which houses both the 
immigration court structure known as the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review (EOIR)14 and the Office for Immigration Litigation (OIL).15 
DHS and DOJ are but two of the plethora of agencies within the 
Executive Branch responsible for administering and enforcing the 
immigration laws.  The Executive Branch’s role in enforcing immigration 
laws is breathtaking and has affected both domestic populations and 
countries of the world.16  Moreover, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
various portions of the United States Constitution to give the “political 
branches” the plenary power to regulate immigration.17  The plenary power 
 




10. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as 
amended in 6 U.S.C.). 
11.  About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, http://cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/. 
12. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov. 
13.  U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis. 
14. Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ 
eoir/. 
15. Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/civil/oil/ 
oil_home.html.  For a more detailed discussion of the different immigration units within DHS and 
DOJ, see Wadhia, supra note 7, at 257–58. 
16. Though Delahunty and Yoo create a distinction between Executive Branch decisions during 
times of “national security” and domestic policy, immigration law is replete with situations where 
the line is blurred or where national security is used by the immigration agency to interrogate, 
detain, and deport noncitizens living in the United States.  See, e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, 
Business as Usual: Immigration and the National Security Exception, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1485 
(2010); Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After 
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295 
(2002); Jennifer M. Chacón, Commentary, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime 
Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007). 
17. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 
609 (1889). 
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doctrine has been applied to exclude and deport noncitizens without a check 
from the judiciary.18 
II. The Obama Administration Has Executed the Immigration Laws 
Faithfully and Forcefully 
Delahunty and Yoo center their argument on Article II, Section Three, 
of the United States Constitution (the Take Care Clause), which states in part 
that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”19  
Specifically, they argue that the Obama Administration’s DACA program is 
a violation of the President’s duties under the Take Care Clause because 
under DACA the President is failing to enforce the immigration statute.20  I 
cannot agree.  First, the DACA program does not violate or undermine the 
immigration statute.  There is no provision in the INA that prohibits the 
Administration from implementing programs like DACA.21  Moreover, the 
immigration agency is charged with utilizing the funds appropriated by 
Congress to enforce the immigration laws against individuals who represent 
a “high priority” for removal, and DACA can be justified as an effort to 
enforce congressionally mandated priorities.22  Moreover, the Obama 
Administration has detained and deported noncitizens at record levels during 
President Obama’s tenure.  To illustrate, ICE removed 392,862 noncitizens 
during fiscal year (FY) 2010, and a record 396,906 noncitizens during FY 
2011.23  Likewise, ICE detained 429,000 individuals in facilities in FY 2011, 
an increase of 18% from the previous fiscal year.24 
Importantly, the President’s faithful execution of the immigration laws 
is not just limited to bringing enforcement actions against individuals and 
ultimately deporting them, but also to prioritizing the deportable population 
in a cost-effective and conscientious manner, and providing benefits to 
 
18. See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 16, at 1524. 
19. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
20. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 785. 
21. On the other hand, the discretionary component that attaches to many forms of removal 
relief in the INA is consistent with the discretionary nature of the Obama Administration’s DACA 
program, suggesting at the very least a consistency (not a contradiction) about the factors that 
should be considered in deciding whether individuals should be protected from removal.  See, e.g., 
INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006). 
22. See Removal Statistics, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/ 
removal-statistics/. 
23.  ICE Total Removals, supra note 6.  By contrast, there were 202,842 removals in 2004; 
189,368 removals in 2003; and 150,542 removals in 2002.  See MARY DOUGHERTY ET AL., U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2004 6 (2005), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/AnnualReportEnforcement2004.pdf. 
24. JOHN SIMANSKI & LESLEY M. SAPP, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2011 4 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/immigration-statistics/enforcement_ar_2011.pdf.  By contrast, the George W. Bush 
Administration detained about 235,247 noncitizens in 2004.  See DOUGHERTY ET AL., supra note 
23, at 1. 




deportable noncitizens when they qualify for them.  The President must 
“walk and chew gum” at the same time to carry out an effective immigration 
policy.  Significantly, Delahunty and Yoo gloss over the significant 
relationship between the Take Care Clause and the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.  The United States has an estimated unauthorized population of 
11.5 million.25  In contrast, Congress has appropriated funds to remove about 
400,000 (less than 4%) of this population.26 
Like with criminal law, there are far many more immigration laws and 
individuals who can be charged and potentially deported for having broken 
such laws than there are resources to prosecute them.  In the criminal law 
field, prosecutorial discretion is frequently exercised, and prosecutors often 
refrain from bringing charges against people who have clearly broken the 
law.  In the criminal context, the Supreme Court has confirmed the 
relationship between the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the Take 
Care Clause: 
A selective-prosecution claim asks a court to exercise judicial power 
over a “special province” of the Executive.  The Attorney General and 
United States Attorneys retain “broad discretion” to enforce the 
Nation's criminal laws.  They have this latitude because they are 
designated by statute as the President's delegates to help him discharge 
his constitutional responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”  As a result, “[t]he presumption of regularity 
supports” their prosecutorial decisions . . . .27 
Similarly, in the administrative law context, the Court elucidated the 
relationship between the Take Care Clause and the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion: 
[W]e recognize that an agency's refusal to institute proceedings shares 
to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the 
Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long been 
regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as 
it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to “take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed.”28 
 
25. MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011 1, (2012), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf. 
26. See Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement to All ICE Emps. 1 (Jun. 30, 2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/ 
releases/2010/civil-enforcement-priorities.pdf; see also SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, 
IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., THE MORTON MEMO AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: AN 
OVERVIEW 4 (2011), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Shoba_-
_Prosecutorial_Discretion_072011_0.pdf. 
27. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
28. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). 




The ultimate source for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the 
Federal Government is the power of the President.29  Under Article II, 
Section 1 of the Constitution, the executive power is vested in the President.  
Article II, Section 3, states that the President “shall take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.” 
Delahunty and Yoo also question the Obama Administration’s 
motivations in creating the DACA program and related costs.30  The analysis 
falls short because the authors misidentify ICE (instead of USCIS) as the 
agency absorbing the costs of DACA;31 fail to explain how the fees generated 
by the DACA program (DACA applicants must pay $465 with their 
application) interact with the USCIS’s funding of the program; and, perhaps 
most importantly, misunderstand that alongside the economic considerations 
are the humanitarian factors that have driven prosecutorial discretion 
decisions for years.  I agree with Delahunty and Yoo that cost savings alone 
cannot explain the DACA program, but I also believe that creating non-
enforcement alternatives for people who have resided in the United States 
from their childhood and exhibit intellectual promise is an acceptable 
motivation for enacting the program. 
III. Prosecutorial Discretion Actions Like DACA Have Been Part of the 
Immigration System for at Least Thirty-Five Years 
Delahunty and Yoo fail to identify the numerous sources of authority 
for prosecutorial discretion in immigration law.  The Supreme Court has 
reviewed the role of prosecutorial discretion in administrative, immigration, 
and criminal law contexts.32  In Arizona v. United States, the Court 
highlighted the important role discretion plays in the immigration 
framework: 
A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion 
exercised by immigration officials. . . . Federal officials, as an initial 
matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all. . . 
. 
 Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces 
immediate human concerns.  Unauthorized workers trying to support 
their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien 
smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime.  The equities of an 
individual case may turn on many factors, including whether the alien 
 
29. Memorandum from Sam Bernsen, Gen. Counsel, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. to 
Comm’r 2 (July 15, 1976), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-
discretion/service-exercise-pd.pdf. 
30. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 847. 
31. Id. at 788. 
32. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506–07 (2012); Reno v. ADC, 525 U.S. 
471, 473 (1999); Heckler, 470 U.S. at 846. 




has children born in the United States, long ties to the community, or a 
record of distinguished military service.33 
Likewise, the U.S. Congress has affirmed the role of prosecutorial 
discretion in immigration law.  In language identifying the evidence that 
would be required for proving lawful status for purposes of a federally 
recognized state driver’s license or identification card, Congress explicitly 
included “deferred action” as a valid lawful status in the REAL ID Act of 
2005.34 
Moreover, several members of Congress encouraged the Obama 
Administration to exercise prosecutorial discretion pursuant to its legal 
authority to provide a safety valve for special populations or individuals.35  
The use of prosecutorial discretion has also been recognized in the 
immigration statute—the Immigration Nationality Act (INA) and its 
 
33. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. 
34. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202(c)(2)(B)(viii), 119 Stat. 231, 313 
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30301), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
109publ13/pdf/PLAW-109publ13.pdf.  Similarly, the phrase “deferred action” appears in two other 
sections of the United States Code, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (IV) (2006) (“(II) Any 
individual described in subclause (I) is eligible for deferred action and work authorization.”; “(IV) 
Any individual described in subclause (III) and any derivative child of a petition described in clause 
(ii) is eligible for deferred action and work authorization.”), and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(d)(2) (Supp. V 
2011) (“(2) The denial of a request for an administrative stay of removal under this subsection shall 
not preclude the alien from applying for a stay of removal, deferred action, or a continuance or 
abeyance of removal proceedings under any other provision of the immigration laws of the United 
States.”).  Delahunty and Yoo examine Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 
343 U.S. 579 (1952), to analyze whether the Obama Administration has the prerogative power to 
violate the law.  Youngstown dealt with President Truman’s power to seize and operate most of the 
steel mills during a labor strike even though such seizure was not authorized by the Constitution or 
a statute.  Id. at 582.  Writing for the majority, Justice Hugo Black held that President Truman had 
no prerogative power because among other things, “[t]he President's power, if any, to issue the order 
must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.  There is no statute that 
expressly authorizes the President to take possession of property as he did here.”  Id. at 585.  At 
least under this point and without conceding that the Obama Administration has violated any law, 
the DACA program appears to satisfy the threshold requirement under Youngstown, namely that 
deferred action stem from a Congressional act or the Constitution. 
35. See, e.g., Hinder the Administration’s Legalization Temptation (HALT) Act: Hearing on 
H.R. 2497 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 57–59 (2011) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Margaret D. Stock), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Stock07262011.pdf; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, 
Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. 
REV. 1, 25–27 (2012); Letter from Members of Cong. to Att’y Gen. Janet Reno & Doris M. 
Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. (Nov. 4, 1999), available at 
http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/Smith_to_Reno_1999.pdf; Durbin, Reid, 20 Senate Democrats 
Write Obama on Current Situation of DREAM Act Students, U.S. SENATE (April 13, 2011), 
http://durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=cc76d912-77db-45ca-99a9-
624716d9299c; Rep. Luis Gutierrez, Ten Reasons Young People Should Come Forward For 
Deferred Action, THE HILL (Aug. 14, 2012, 10:27 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/homeland-security/243567-ten-reasons-young-people-should-come-forward-for-deferred-
action. 
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governing regulations.  The general authority for prosecutorial discretion can 
be found in § 103(a), which reads: 
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the 
administration and enforcement of this Act and all other laws relating 
to the immigration and naturalization of aliens, except insofar as this 
Act or such laws relate to the powers, functions, and duties conferred 
upon the President, Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the 
officers of the Department of State, or diplomatic or consular officers: 
Provided, however, That determination and ruling by the Attorney 
General with respect to all questions of law shall be controlling.36 
Moreover, § 242(g) of the INA cabins three particular acts of 
prosecutorial discretion that are shielded from judicial review, namely the 
commencement of proceedings, adjudication of cases, and the execution of 
removal orders.37  Finally, the governing regulations explicitly name 
“deferred action” as a basis for eligibility for work authorization.38 
The legal authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion is not merely 
theoretical.  The agency’s use of deferred action was first revealed in 1975 in 
connection with the immigration case of music icon John Lennon.39  The 
immigration agency (then INS) relied upon a guidance called the “Operations 
Instruction,” which stated, “(ii) Deferred action.  In every case where the 
district director determines that adverse action would be unconscionable 
because of the existence of appealing humanitarian factors, he shall 
recommend consideration for deferred action category.”40 
While the Operations Instruction was rescinded in 1997, the agency 
continued to exercise prosecutorial discretion in compelling immigration 
cases, relying largely on a memorandum from the former INS Commissioner 
Doris Meissner issued in 2000 and titled Exercising Prosecutorial 
Discretion.41  Following the demise of INS and creation of the DHS, and 
throughout the George W. Bush Administration, the Meissner Memorandum 
operated as good policy.  During the George W. Bush Administration, DHS 
issued at least two documents reaffirming the principles of the Meissner 
Memorandum and elucidating special cases worthy of prosecutorial 
discretion.42 
 
36. INA § 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2006). 
37. See INA § 242(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2006); see also Reno, 525 U.S. at 482. 
38. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2012). 
39. See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 7, at 246–47; Leon Wildes, The Operations Instructions of the 
Immigration Service: Internal Guides or Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99, 101 (1979). 
40. See David v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 548 F.2d 219, 223 n.1 (8th Cir. 1977). 
41. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., to 
Reg’l Dirs. et al. (Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://iwp.legalmomentum.org/reference/additional-
materials/immigration/enforcement-detention-and-criminal-justice/government-
documents/22092970-INS-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Doris-Meissner-11-7-00.pdf. 
42. See, e.g., Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, on Prosecutorial 
Discretion (Oct. 24, 2005) (on file with author); Memorandum from Julie L. Myers, Assistant Sec’y 




The exercise of prosecutorial discretion has not been limited to 
individual cases, but has also been applied to special categories of 
noncitizens.43  To illustrate, from 1960 through 1990, the Attorney General 
used a form of prosecutorial discretion known as “Extended Voluntary 
Departure” (EVD) to protect classes of noncitizens for humanitarian 
reasons.44  Today, the program is called “Deferred Enforcement Departure” 
(DED) and is exercised by the Secretary of Homeland Security.  According 
to the Congressional Research Service: 
The discretionary procedures of DED and EVD continue to be used to 
provide relief the Administration feels is appropriate, and the 
executive branch’s position is that all blanket relief decisions require a 
balance of judgment regarding foreign policy, humanitarian, and 
immigration concerns.  Unlike [Temporary Protected Status], aliens 
who benefit from EVD or DED do not necessarily register for the 
status with USCIS, but they trigger the protection when they are 
identified for deportation.  If, however, they wish to be employed in 
the United States, they must apply for a work authorization from 
USCIS.45 
Deferred action is another form of prosecutorial discretion the 
immigration agency has used to protect certain individuals from deportation.  
In 2005, the USCIS announced deferred action for the approximately 5,500 
foreign academic students affected by Hurricane Katrina.46  In 2009, USCIS 
announced deferred action for the widows of U.S. citizens for two years.47  In 
the official press release, DHS Secretary Napolitano is quoted as saying, 
 
of Homeland Sec., Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to Field Office Dirs. & Special Agents in 
Charge (Nov. 7, 2007), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/22092973/ICE-Guidance-Memo-
Prosecutorial-Discretion-Julie-Myers-11-7-07. 
43. See Wadhia, supra note 7, at 246–47; Letter from a Group of Law Professors to President 
Obama, supra note 7; JANUARY CONTRERAS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DEFERRED ACTION: 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY AND CONSISTENCY IN THE USCIS PROCESS 
(2011). 
44. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL—
REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION § 38.2, available at  http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/ 
AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-16606/0-0-0-16764.html; see also Hotel & Rest. Emps. Union, 
Local 25 v. Att’y Gen., 804 F.2d 1256, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
45. RUTH ELLEN WASEM & KARMA ESTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20844, TEMPORARY 
PROTECTED STATUS: CURRENT IMMIGRATION POLICY AND ISSUES 4 (2006), available at 
http://pards.org/tps/tps2006,0207-CRS.pdf. 
46. See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., USCIS Announces Interim 
Relief for Foreign Students Adversely Impacted by Hurricane Katrina (Nov. 25, 2005), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/F1Student_11_25_05_PR.pdf; see also Short-Term 
Employment Authorization and Reduced Course Load for Certain F-1 Nonimmigrant Students 
Adversely Affected by Hurricane Katrina, 70 Fed. Reg. 70,992, 70,992–70,996 (Nov. 25, 2005) (to 
be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 214). 
47. See DHS Establishes Interim Relief for Widows of U.S. Citizens, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
HOMELAND SECURITY (June 9, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/06/09/dhs-establishes-
interim-relief-widows-us-citizens. 
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“Granting deferred action to the widows and widowers of U.S. citizens who 
otherwise would have been denied the right to remain in the United States 
allows these individuals and their children an opportunity to stay in the 
country that has become their home while their legal status is resolved.”48 
Deferred action has also been used to protect individuals applying for 
relief under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).49  VAWA was 
enacted by Congress in 1994 and twice amended to include statutory 
remedies for abused spouses, parents, and children; victims of crimes and 
domestic abuse; and victims of human trafficking.50  One protection under 
VAWA allows abused spouses and children of U.S. citizens and green card 
holders (lawful permanent residents) or the abused parents of U.S. citizens to 
file petitions for themselves with USCIS.51  The self-petition process is 
critical to victims of domestic violence and abuse because it allows them to 
achieve a positive immigration status without having to rely on their abuser.  
If the self petition is ultimately approved, and the noncitizen is not in a legal 
immigration status, she is granted deferred action status, the opportunity to 
apply for work authorization, and eventually lawful permanent residence.52  
Between 1997 and 2011, 98,192 VAWA petitions were filed with the 
USCIS, of which 75% were approved.53  Deferred action has also been used 
as a mechanism to keep immigrants who are the spouses, parents, and 
children of military members together.54 
The examples identified above are not exhaustive but demonstrate how 
the immigration agency has long used the instrument of prosecutorial 




49. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 
1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 13701). 
50. See WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42477, IMMIGRATION PROVISIONS 
OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (VAWA) 26–27 & n.143, 30 (2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42477.pdf. 
51. See INA §§ 204(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (IV), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (IV) (2009); 
KANDEL, supra note 43, at 3 (listing “abused noncitizen spouses married to U.S. citizens or LPRs; 
noncitizen parents in such a marriage whose children were abused by U.S. citizens or LPRs; 
unmarried noncitizen children under age 21 abused by a U.S. citizen or LPR parent; and noncitizen 
parents abused by U.S. citizen adult children” as those who may self-petition through VAWA in 
general); Battered Spouse, Children & Parents, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,  
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid
=b85c3e4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=b85c3e4d77d73210VgnVC
M100000082ca60aRCRD (last updated Jan. 16, 2013). 
52. See KANDEL, supra note 43, at 4; see also Mayte Santacruz Benavidez, Learning from the 
Recent Interpretation of INA Section 245(a): Factors to Consider When Interpreting Immigration 
Law, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1603, 1607, 1624–27 (2008). 
53. KANDEL, supra note 43, at 4–5. 
54. See, e.g., Letter from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Zoe Lofgren, 
Representative, U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 30, 2010), in Hearing, supra note 35, at 60 
(statement of Margaret D. Stock). 




IV. DACA Is Not the DREAM Act. 
Delahunty and Yoo charge that by creating the DACA program, the 
Obama Administration “effectively wrote into law ‘the DREAM Act.’”55  
While it is true that would-be DREAMers bear the equities and qualities that 
would be traditionally considered under a prosecutorial discretion policy, it is 
inaccurate to conclude that the DACA program is identical to the DREAM 
Act.  The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act 
(DREAM Act)56 is a piece of legislation that has been introduced in several 
Congresses, most recently in 2011.57  The DREAM Act would allow for the 
“cancellation of removal and adjustment of status of certain alien students 
who . . . entered the United States as children.”58  Put another way, 
beneficiaries of the DREAM Act are provided with a secure lawful status and 
benefit under the laws and the opportunity to apply for permanent status.  
The DREAM Act contains a series of requirements relating to continuous 
physical presence, good moral character, and age at the time of entry into the 
United States.59  Significantly, the DREAM Act requires the noncitizen to 
show that she bears no significant criminal history and is “not inadmissible” 
under the INA.  By contrast, DACA results in no lawful status, no path to 
permanent residency, and no means for qualifying for U.S. citizenship.  
Notably, following its announcement of DACA, the DHS published the 
following question and answer regarding the importance of passing the 
DREAM Act: 
 Q14: Is passage of the DREAM Act still necessary in light of the 
new process? 
 A14: Yes.  The Secretary of Homeland Security’s June 15th 
memorandum allowing certain people to request consideration for 
deferred action is the most recent in a series of steps that DHS has 
taken to focus its enforcement resources on the removal of individuals 
who pose a danger to national security or a risk to public safety.  
Deferred action does not provide lawful status or a pathway to 
citizenship.  As the President has stated, individuals who would 
qualify for the DREAM Act deserve certainty about their status.  Only 
 
55. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 784. 
56. Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2011, H.R. 1842, 112th Cong. 
(2011). 
57. See, e.g., H.R. 1842; S. 952; see also Michael A. Olivas, The Political Economy of the 
DREAM Act and the Legislative Process: A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55 
WAYNE L. REV. 1757, 1785–86 (2009); AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., 
THE DREAM ACT: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMMIGRANT STUDENTS AND SUPPORTING THE 
U.S. ECONOMY 1, 5 (2011), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Dream_Act_ 
updated_051811.pdf. 
58. H.R. 1842; S. 952; see also Olivas, supra note 56, at 1785 n.121. 
59. See, e.g., H.R. 1842 § 3(a)(1); S. 952 § (3)(b)(1). 
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the Congress, acting through its legislative authority, can confer the 
certainty that comes with a pathway to permanent lawful status.60 
V. Conclusion 
 While the DACA program “feels” like something more or greater in 
scope than previous acts of prosecutorial discretion, the authority being 
exercised by the agency is no greater or different.  I believe the discomfort 
held by opponents of DACA is linked less to the legality of the program and 
tied more to a fear about increased immigration generally, the size of the 
population who appear to be eligible for DACA, the public fanfare the 
program has received, or a combination of the three.  Contrary to the 
outcome drawn by Delahunty and Yoo, the Obama Administration has not 
decided “not to enforce the removal provisions of the [INA] against an 
estimated population of 800,000 to 1.76 million individuals illegally present 
in the United States,” but has created a program that enables qualifying 
applicants to be considered for deferred action on an individualized basis if 
they meet specific criteria and in the exercise of the USCIS’s prosecutorial 
discretion.61 
As of November 15, 2012, less than 55,000 have been granted deferred 
action under the DACA program.62  In fact, many eligible individuals are 
choosing not to apply for DACA because of the costs of applying, the 
tenuous posture of deferred action, and related concerns about turning over 
information about themselves and their family members.63  More 
importantly, it is dangerous to argue that the potential size of the class that 
stands to benefit from DACA or the greater transparency somehow makes 
the DACA program legally unsound or different.  Conceivably, a future 
Administration could place a cap on the number of applications that can be 
approved under DACA, but this is a policy question, not a constitutional one. 
Lastly, and fundamental to the understanding of the theory of 
prosecutorial discretion in immigration law, are the economic and 
humanitarian motivations that have driven such discretion for more than 
thirty-five years.  Prosecutorial discretion is not just a wise enforcement 
policy because it enables the agency to manage resources in a paradigm 
 




61. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1 at 783. 
62.  Office Of Performance And Quality, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Nov. 16, 2012), available at http://www.uscis.gov/ 
USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/Static_files/2012-
1116%20DACA%20Monthly%20Report.pdf. 
63. See, e.g., Saundra Amrhein, Immigrants Come Out of the Shadows to Fulfill a Dream, 
REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2012, 3:25 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/24/us-usa-
immigration-deferment-idUSBRE89N07K20121024. 




where it has the capacity to remove just a slice of the population that is 
technically deportable from the United States, but also because there are 
significant humanitarian considerations that have historically been and 
continue to be acknowledged in determining whether discretion should be 
exercised.  Would-be DREAMers who are living in the shadows with a string 
of compelling attributes and equities in the United States present a 
humanitarian situation that is perfectly suited for deferred action. 
